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Criminal Law.  State v. Moten, 187 A.3d 1080 (R.I. 2018).  Without 
a specific objection, an issue is determined to have been waived for 
purposes of appeal.  The trial justice serves as the thirteenth juror, 
considering all of the material evidence in the record and 
independently weighing that evidence.  If, after this assessment, 
the trial justice reaches the same conclusion as the jury, then the 
verdict should be affirmed and the motion for a new trial should be 
denied.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
The altercation at issue in this case was the culmination of a 
long-standing rivalry between two Providence gangs, YNIC and the 
Chad Brown gang.1  On the morning of October 22, 2014, Bruce 
Moten (Defendant), Henry Lopez (Henry),2 and Tevin Briggs 
(Tevin), all members of the YNIC gang, were at the Garrahy 
Judicial Complex when they spoke with two other YNIC gang 
members who had “got into a situation”: members of the Chad 
Brown gang had surrounded the two men on the fourth floor of the 
courthouse.3  About an hour after leaving the courthouse, the 
Defendant, Henry, and Tevin received a phone call from fellow 
YNIC member Antonio Fortes (Tone) informing them that Kendrick 
Johnson (Kendrick), a Chad Brown gang member, was at the PC 
Mart on the corner of Douglas Avenue and Eaton Street in 
Providence.4  At the suggestion of the Defendant, Henry drove the 
Defendant and Tevin to the PC Mart to follow Kendrick.5  The 
Defendant, Henry, and Tevin were in Henry’s black Infiniti.6 
1. State v. Moten, 187 A.3d 1080, 1081 (R.I. 2018).
2. Consistent with the Court’s opinion, parties will be referred to by their
first names. 
3. Id. at 1082.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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When the three YNIC members arrived at the PC Mart, they 
noticed Kendrick, Delacey Andrade (Delacey), and Terry Robinson 
(Terry), all Chad Brown gang members, leaving the store.7  Henry 
proceeded to follow Kendrick’s car to the Chad Brown housing 
complex.8  Leaving Henry at the wheel of the parked car, the 
Defendant and Tevin exited Henry’s car with their hoods pulled up 
and guns in the waistbands of their sweatpants.9  Upon hearing 
several gunshots, Henry drove to the intersection of Fillmore and 
Oregon Street, where the Defendant and Tevin met him “with their 
guns in their hands.”10  Henry then drove the two men to the home 
of one of his girlfriends, Yhaira Montanez (Yadi).11 
At the direction of Henry and Tevin, Yadi drove Henry’s black 
Infiniti to the home of Courtney Rivers (Courtney).12  When Yadi 
returned to her home, she found the three men sitting with their 
guns at her kitchen table discussing the earlier incident.13  During 
this time, the Defendant told Yadi “[i]t was either us or them” while 
displaying scars on his stomach.14  
On April 10, 2015 the Defendant, Henry, Tevin, and Tone were 
all indicted in Providence County Superior Court and charged with 
nine felony counts: murder; discharging a firearm while committing 
a crime of violence, death resulting; assault with a dangerous 
weapon; discharging a firearm while committing a crime of 
violence, injury resulting; assault with a dangerous weapon; 
discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence; 
conspiracy; and two counts of carrying a pistol without a license.15  
Henry entered into a cooperation agreement with the State in 
exchange for a fifty-year sentencing cap.16  Beginning on October 4, 
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.  The Providence police received a report of the shooting at
approximately 11:30 a.m.  Id.  Emergency personnel arrived at the crime scene 
to find Terry “gunned down and deceased” and Delacey injured with a gunshot 
wound to his buttocks.  Id. at 1082–83.  The Court noted that Henry was also 
dating another woman at the time of the incident.  Id. at 1082 n.3. 
12. Id. at 1083.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1083–84.
16. Id. at 1084.
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2016, the Defendant was tried before a jury in Superior Court.17  
The trial lasted ten days.18  
Henry testified at the trial about the fatal shooting.19  Henry’s 
testimony was corroborated by a multitude of technical evidence 
presented by the State.20  The evidence included video footage 
depicting Henry, Tevin, and the Defendant entering the Garrahy 
Judicial Complex; video showing Kendrick’s black Camry at the PC 
Mart; and a video from the Chad Brown housing complex depicting 
Henry’s black Infiniti driving around the area of the crime scene, 
two men walking in the direction of Fillmore Street and then racing 
back to the Infiniti, and the Infiniti speeding down Fillmore 
Street.21  Additionally, the State introduced cell-site data and cell 
phone records that further corroborated Henry’s story.22  
The State presented “Agent Jennifer Banks of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Cellular Analysis Survey Team 
(CAST), as an expert witness in historical cell-site analysis.”23 
After extensive research and analysis, Agent Banks determined 
that the “[D]efendant’s phone was in or near the area of the 
shooting at the time.”24  At no point did the Defendant object to 
Agent Banks’s testimony.25  
The State also introduced the testimony of Detective Theodore 
Michael, a forensic cell phone examiner with the Providence Police 
Department.26  The Defendant objected to Detective Michael’s 
testimony, questioning his expertise in in the field of historical cell-
site analysis.27  The State responded, explaining that Agent Banks 
offered the expert testimony on cell-site analysis, while Detective 
Michael’s testimony would encompass only the data he physically 
obtained from the various cell phones involved.28  The trial justice 
overruled the Defendant’s objection stating, “I’m satisfied that the 
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1084–85.
22. Id. at 1085.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1086.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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witness has sufficient qualifications to testify in the mode that the 
State is going to pursue.  The objection is overruled.  Do you wish 
to have any voir dire?”29  The Defendant declined to question 
Detective Michael about his qualifications and did not object to any 
portion of his trial testimony.30 
At trial, the Defendant submitted the theory that it was 
actually Courtney, not the Defendant, who was involved in the 
shooting.31  However, Detective Michael testified that Courtney’s 
cell phone was not near the crime scene at the time of the murder 
by using historical cell-site information contained in Courtney’s call 
log.32  On cross-examination, the Defendant attempted to rebut 
Detective Michael’s testimony by asserting that someone else could 
have been using Courtney’s cell phone while Courtney was at the 
crime scene.33 
At the completion of the State’s case, the trial justice “granted 
the [D]efendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count 9, 
carrying a pistol without a license.”34  On October 18, 2016, the jury 
found the Defendant guilty of the remaining eight counts.35  The 
Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that Henry was the sole 
witness who was able to put the Defendant at the crime scene and 
that the State had failed to introduce any other competent evidence 
to prove the Defendant was one of the shooters.36  The trial justice 
denied the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and sentenced the 
Defendant to two consecutive life sentences, with an additional 
seventy years, and a ten year suspended sentence with probation.37 
The Defendant timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court (the Court), arguing that the trial justice erred by permitting 
Detective Michael to offer a lay person’s opinion concerning the 
location of Courtney’s cell phone at the time of the shooting and by 
denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial.38  
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1087.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1087–88.
38. Id. at 1081, 1088.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On appeal, the Defendant argued that (1) the Detective’s 
testimony severely undercut the Defendant’s theory that it was 
Courtney, and not the Defendant, who participated in the shooting 
and (2) Detective Michael was neither qualified as an expert in 
historical cell-site analysis nor did he possess the knowledge and 
training to contribute a technically sound opinion.39  The Court 
determined that the Defendant had waived the second argument 
regarding Detective Michael’s qualifications.40  The Court cited the 
“raise-or-waive rule,” which states that “‘if an issue was not 
preserved by specific objection at trial, then it may not be 
considered on appeal.’”41  Explaining the policy, the Court stated 
that “[t]his Court ‘requires a specific objection so that the allegation 
of error can be brought to the attention of the trial justice, who will 
then have an opportunity to rule on it.’”42 
The Court then noted that the Defendant did not raise an 
objection to any portion of Detective Michael’s testimony, but on 
appeal is taking issue with the portion of Detective Michael’s 
testimony which places Courtney away from the scene of 
shooting.43 The Court made it clear that the Defendant cannot 
object to Detective Michael’s testimony at the appellate level when 
he did not object in Superior Court.44 The Court stated, “[t]he 
defendant is not entitled to a ‘do over’ simply because he is not 
satisfied with how his trial strategy panned out.”45  
The Defendant also asserted that the trial justice “erred in 
denying his motion for a new trial based on the weight of the 
evidence . . . contend[ing] that he was entitled to a new trial because 
the only evidence incriminating him as a principal shooter came 
from Henry, who, [the Defendant] alleges, had a motive to lie based 
upon his plea agreement.”46  In response, the Court explained for 
new trial motions based on the weight of the evidence, 
39. Id. at 1088.
40. Id. (citing State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013)).
41. Id. (quoting Pona, 66 A.3d at 468).
42. Id. (quoting Pona, 66 A.3d at 468).
43. Id. at 1088.
44. Id. at 1089.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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[t]he trial justice must consider, in the exercise of his [or
her] independent judgment, all the material evidence in
the case, in the light of his [or her] charge to the jury and
pass on its weight and the credibility of the witnesses,
determine what evidence is believable, and, decide whether
the verdict rendered by  the jury responds to the evidence
presented and does justice between the parties.47
Here, the Court recognized the trial justice’s detailed 
summarization of the evidence and emphasized that he “carefully 
performed his duty as a thirteenth juror, considering all of the 
material evidence in the record and independently weighing that 
evidence.”48  For these reasons, the Court affirmed the judgment of 
the Superior Court.49 
COMMENTARY 
The Court affirmed the findings of the Superior Court, in part, 
because the Defendant did not state a specific objection at trial and 
therefore was not permitted to raise the objection on appeal.50  
Here, the Court made it clear that unless there is a specific 
objection, the issue has not been properly preserved for appeal.51  
Strict compliance with the “raise or waive” rule52 is necessary to 
give the trial justice the opportunity to rule on the issue53 and to 
prevent a defendant from appealing when his trial strategy did not 
pan out in an attempt to seek a “do over.”54   
The Court also correctly decided the Defendant’s second claim 
of error, where the Defendant asserted that the trial justice erred 
by denying the Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the 
weight of the evidence.55  The Court examined the trial record and 
the trial justice’s detailed notes—affording great deference to his 
credibility determinations.56  The Court looked to precedent to 
47. Id. (quoting McGarry v. Pielech, 47 A.3d 271, 280 (R.I. 2012)).
48. Id. at 1089–90.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1088.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 1088 (quoting State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 468 (R.I. 2013)).
54. See id. at 1089.
55. See id. at 1089.
56. Id. at 1090.
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justify the great deference afforded to trial justices explaining, 
“‘[w]e do not have the same vantage point as [him or her] and we 
are unable to assess the witness’ demeanor, tone of voice, and body 
language.’”57 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Superior Court because the Defendant failed to state a specific 
objection and therefore waived the issue for appeal, and because the 
Court found no error on the part of the trial justice in denying the 
Defendant’s motion for a new trial.  
Anna L. Kramer 
57. Id. (quoting State v. Jensen, 40 A.3d 771, 778 (R.I. 2012)).
